How do partisan media affect polarization in newly liberalized regimes? Partisan media are often blamed for discord, intolerance, and instability. However, there is little empirical work on the subject, and information-processing theories suggest that extreme position taking is only one possible response to opinionated news. Rather, partisan media may cause moderation by exposing citizens to alternate viewpoints. We conducted a field experiment in Ghana in which tro-tros (commuter mini-buses) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Passengers heard live talk-radio from a pro-government, pro-opposition, or neutral station, or were in a noradio control. We find no effect of like-minded media on polarization, but significant evidence of moderation from exposure to cross-cutting broadcasts, indicating that subjects were persuaded by rival arguments. Partisan broadcasts also encouraged displays of national over partisan identity. Rather than fueling extremism, we argue that partisan media can moderate by exposing citizens to alternate perspectives.
How do partisan media affect polarization in newly liberalized regimes? Opinionated media, which often emerge in the wake of media liberalization, are frequently blamed for political discord, intolerance, and instability. Observers worry that biased content polarizes citizenries and threatens democratic prospects. However, many democratic theorists argue that exposure to diverse viewpoints fosters moderation, tolerance, and compromise (Barber 1984; Habermas 1989; Mill [1859] 1999), which are crucial for progress in polities with histories of authoritarianism and conflict. Since individuals are unlikely to encounter opposing attitudes within homogenous social networks, partisan media may be the most prevalent source of alternate perspectives (Mutz and Martin 2001; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011) . According to this reasoning, partisan media may help, rather than harm, democracy and stability.
This article examines the effects of exposure to partisan media on citizen attitudes about political candidates, as well as on behavioral displays of partisan over national identities. We evaluate whether individuals exposed to media that favor their preferred party (i.e., like-minded exposure) become more extreme in their partisan attitudes as a result. Importantly, we also test the effects of content that challenges partisan preferences (i.e., cross-cutting exposure), which has received much less scholarly attention.
To do so we conducted a novel field experiment weeks prior to the 2012 elections in Ghana, an emerging democracy in Africa where many fear that partisan media are contributing to polarization. We made use of captive audiences traveling in tro-tros, which are privately operated minibuses that comprise the backbone of the transportation system in the capital, Accra.
Typically, riders are exposed to radio of the driver's choosing; under our design, drivers played stations we assigned. Tro-tros were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: pro-government, pro-opposition, or neutral political talk radio, or the control (no radio). Upon completing their commute, 1200 subjects from 228 tro-tros were interviewed.
We find that partisan media moderate attitudes. There is no difference in attitudinal extremity between subjects exposed to like-minded media and those not exposed to radio.
Instead, we find significant evidence that exposure to cross-cutting broadcasts begets partisan ambivalence and encourages displays of national over partisan identity. Rather than fueling extremism, our evidence suggests that partisan media provoked reconsideration of initial positions.
Our results have important theoretical and methodological implications for scholarship on partisan media. First, the dominant perspective expects polarization because it assumes individuals engage in motivated reasoning, in that they are more persuaded by their own side and/or they counter-argue with the other (for a recent review, see Levendusky 2013) . 1 However, we argue that motivated reasoning is less common in many newly liberalized settings, due to populations' limited political sophistication and shifting political alliances. As a result,
individuals will be open to persuasion by arguments from the other side. Second, existing methodologies, which rely heavily on laboratory experiments, might lead to overestimation of 1 An additional expected consequence of motivated reasoning is selective exposure (Stroud 2011 ), which we discuss in the conclusion. Our experiment is designed to measure the effects of exposure to like-minded and cross-cutting media, rather than one's choice of media.
Nonetheless, there are empirical and theoretical reasons to expect that cross-cutting exposure is common in post-liberalization settings, as we discuss with reference to implications of our results.
the polarizing effects of partisan media, and we introduce an alternate approach. Subjects in our field experiment were exposed to live broadcasts in a natural setting, giving the design high external validity, while still maintaining the inferential benefits of random assignment.
This paper proceeds in six sections. The first lays out competing theoretical expectations about the polarizing or moderating potential of partisan media. We then introduce the Ghanaian case. Third, we discuss our experimental design and data collection. The fourth section presents the results of our analyses, which the fifth discusses. We conclude with a discussion of the potential for moderating effects of partisan media in newly liberalized environments.
Theorizing the Effects of Partisan Media in New Democracies and Hybrid Regimes
Media liberalization has yielded privatized and pluralized environments in many postauthoritarian countries, where state-run outlets once dominated. While necessary for enhanced political competition, deliberation and accountability, many believe these reforms have Janusfaced qualities. Many newly established outlets are owned by politicians or their allies, who use these mouthpieces to propagate their views (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Nyamnjoh 2005: 56-59) .
The predominant view is that such partisan media exacerbate partisan cleavages. This polarization could, by extension, contribute to the rise of anti-democratic elites (Sartori 1976 , Linz 1978 , Valenzuela 1978 , intra-state conflict Ray 1994, 1999) , and weaker economic performance (Frye 2002) . Samantha Power wrote evocatively of killers in Rwanda who "carried a machete in one hand and a radio transistor in the other " (2001: 89) , in reference to the anti-Tutsi propaganda spewed by Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), the first private radio station established there after media liberalization. Academic and policy communities typically focus on extreme cases, such as Rwanda, Kenya, and the Balkans, where violence coincided with indecent broadcasts (Abdi and Deane 2008; IRIN 2008; Sofos 1999 , Thompson 1999 , Palmer 2001 , to surmise the dangers of biased media in other newly liberalized societies.
The widespread expectation of polarization from partisan media in developing countries is echoed by most researchers of partisan media in the United States (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Jamieson and Cappella 2008; Sunstein 2009; Dilliplane 2011; Stroud 2011; Williams and Delli Carpini 2011; Baum 2012; Levendusky 2013; Jacobson 2010; Allen and Moehler 2013; Prior 2007) . Like-minded media might generate more extreme views by augmenting argument repertoires, boosting confidence in the probity of beliefs, intensifying feelings, and exacerbating in/out-group sentiments (Levendusky 2013; Arceneaux, et al. 2013) . Cross-cutting messages have received far less attention, but the most common expectation is that individuals dismiss or argue against perspectives that are not compatible with their pre-existing beliefs, thus making their initial attitudes even more extreme (Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; Redlawsk 2002 ).
According to this first perspective, partisan media polarize because, on average, the reinforcing effects of like-minded exposure are larger than any persuading powers of crosscutting exposure, and/or cross-cutting exposure provokes counter-argument and intensification of biases. Importantly, this pessimistic perspective requires some degree of partisan-motivated reasoning, such that individuals find their party's arguments most convincing, ignore discordant opinions, or argue against claims from the other side (Levendusky 2013 ).
An alternate theoretical perspective suggests that exposure to partisan media could moderate attitudes. A venerable tradition within democratic theory argues that democracy is strengthened when citizens are exposed to alternate perspectives (Barber 1984; Habermas 1989; Mill [1859] 1999), which foster mutual understanding, reevaluation of positions, and adoption of more moderate stances.
While this perspective is commonly deployed to understand the effect of interpersonal discussions across party lines and cross-cutting social networks (Mutz 2002a (Mutz , 2002b (Mutz , 2006 Huckfeldt, et al. 2004; Nir 2011; Klofstad, et al. 2013) , research on partisan media largely ignores it. 2 We argue that it is also applicable to the study of partisan media in many contexts.
Mass media are primary sources of exposure to opposing political views (Mutz and Martin 2001; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011) , especially where personal networks are ethnically and politically segregated, as they often are in the developing world. In such environments, cross-cutting media might be especially influential because they provide novel information and perspectives, whereas like-minded media duplicate arguments heard elsewhere (Morley and Walker 1987) .
Furthermore, partisan media might be more effective in delivering alternate perspectives than non-partisan outlets, because partisan media tend to present arguments in captivating, unidirectional, and straightforward ways (Druckman, et al. 2010; Feldman 2011; Zaller 1992 ).
2 Our research is part of a small but growing body investigating the effects of cross-cutting media separately from like-minded media. Several scholars also note that cross-cutting media can persuade under certain circumstances. However, they theorize that, on average, cross-cutting media persuade less than like-minded media, or that partisan media persuade irrespective of partisanship (see Druckman and Parkin 2005; Dilliplane forthcoming; Feldman 2011; Levendusky 2013) . We theorize that, in many post-liberalization settings, cross-cutting media should be more influential than like-minded media, and cross-cutting media can persuade even when like-minded media do not. In short, other scholars expect polarization or parallel effects, on average, while we posit that moderation is also a plausible outcome for most individuals.
Strident partisan programming can help citizens pay attention to and understand arguments from the other side.
According to this approach, partisan broadcasts from opposing sides can cause attitudinal moderation in ways that enhance democracy and national unity. Importantly, this optimistic perspective assumes that partisan-motivated information processing is limited (Levendusky 2013) . Rather than arguing against cross-cutting messages, individuals might pay attention to them, regardless of the source, and accept attitude-challenging claims.
To our knowledge, there have been no attempts to study how privately owned partisan media affect attitude extremity in post-liberalization settings using survey or experimental evidence. 3 In our next section, we discuss the case of Ghana, where media liberalization has meant a rise in partisan media that many fear are exacerbating inter-party divisions.
Case Background: Partisan Media and Polarization in Ghana
Ghana is a useful case for studying partisan media and polarization in post-liberalization settings. Media liberalization there has resulted in the emergence of myriad partisan outlets, particularly in print and FM radio. Most of Ghana's post-independence history was marked by single-party or military rule, under which media were significantly restricted (Hachten 1971: 167-70; Asante 1996; Hasty 2005: 33-4) . A return to multipartyism in1992 was accompanied by the emergence of dozens of independent newspapers and the end of the state-run Ghana 3 Two studies, both on 1994 Rwanda, come to somewhat differing conclusions about the role of the media in violence (Straus 2007; Yanagizawa-Drott 2010) , but neither includes individuallevel analysis.
Broadcasting Corporation's de jure radio monopoly (Temin and Smith 2002) . By October 2012, 225 FM stations were operating, 70% of which were commercially owned. [O]pen political bias and falsehood have eaten into our media practice… [T]alk radio has led to all sorts of characters with no capacity to discuss issues of national importance being given the opportunity to shout hoarse on our airwaves, throwing abuse and insults and feeding us with shallow arguments that further misinform our society ("JJ Blasts
Media," Daily Guide, 2012).
During our fieldwork, representatives from NGOs told us that opinionated content was so problematic that governmental curbs on speech freedoms might be warranted. However, despite the widespread belief that biased media are polarizing Ghanaians, evidence of a causal relationship is lacking so far.
Experimental Design and Data Collection
To test the effects of exposure to partisan media on attitude extremity in Ghana, we conducted a field experiment in which we randomly exposed individuals to one of four treatments: two political-talk programs on partisan radio stations (one pro-government, one proopposition), one political-talk program on a neutral station, and no radio (the control). Since our subject population included government and opposition supporters, this design allows us to measure the effects of like-minded and cross-cutting messages.
We administered our treatments in tro-tros, which are privately owned vans, usually with capacities of 15-20 individuals. Our subject population was morning tro-tro riders in Accra, Ghana's capital and largest city. Discussions with Ghanaians, and our own experiences with similar transportation in various African countries (including Ghana), demonstrated that commuters are often captive to the tro-tro driver's musical or talk-radio preferences. Given that Ghanaians are frequently exposed to like-minded or cross-cutting messages in these settings, trotros seemed ideal for the administration of treatments.
In the study of media effects, experimental research has important advantages because it avoids identification problems that occur as a result of self-selection. Our field-based design also has significant advantages in terms of external validity as compared to previous experimental work on media effects, much of which is conducted in laboratory settings. We exposed our subjects to treatments in an environment in which they would often hear both likeminded and cross-cutting messages; with messages created by actual outlets, rather than by researchers; and in an unobtrusive manner (i.e., without subjects' knowledge that they were being included in a study on media effects either at the time of exposure or during data collection). This last feature is particularly important, in that alternate designs, such as laboratory studies, might artificially raise subjects' sensitivity to biased content and source cues, thus increasing probability of argument against cross-cutting messages-and diminishing these messages' persuasive potential. Our design also minimizes Hawthorne effects.
The randomization occurred at the level of the tro-tro, such that each van in the study was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. Thus, all passengers in a given van were de facto assigned to that condition. We interviewed 1200 respondents, 5 who rode in 228 vans, plying 57 routes, during 15 days of research (16 October-7 November 2012). The remainder of this section describes the selection of radio treatments, tro-tro routes, vans, and respondents, as well as the procedures used to execute and verify random assignment of treatments.
Selection of radio treatments: live, political, popular, and biased broadcasts
Our treatments included live broadcasts from actual Ghanaian radio stations. Our strategy of using live broadcasts, rather than tailored or simulated stimuli, accounts for realworld variation in programming. 6 Bias on a partisan station can be subtle at times, and coverage might sometimes contain discussions of a non-political news item, such as a sporting event or 5 We include only the 752 partisan subjects in our sample for analyses, because only partisans can be coded for like-minded and cross-cutting exposure.
6 Live broadcasts also ensured that subjects would not be alerted to the experiment. celebrity sex scandal. If our data do allow us to reject null hypotheses, we can be more confident that similar effects operate beyond our study.
In order to select the partisan and neutral stations we would use as treatments, we discussed options with Ghanaian academics, journalists, representatives of media-monitoring organizations, and radio program directors. Three criteria in addition to the partisan reputation of the station guided our selection. First, we wanted to choose stations that are frequently played on tro-tros so that subjects would not be cognizant of differences between their experimental and normal commute experiences. Second, although some stations have afternoon, evening, or weekend political programming, weekday morning hours are the primary time when political programs overlap across multiple stations. In order to make randomization feasible, we focused only on stations with political programming between 6 and 10 AM. Thid, we selected from stations that mainly broadcast these programs in Twi, the lingua franca in Accra.
On these bases, we chose Radio Gold as the pro-government station and Oman FM as the pro-opposition station. We chose Peace FM as the neutral station because it also has a lively morning political-talk show, the largest listenership in Greater Accra, and a reputation for balance. These programs-Gold Power Drive on Gold, National Agenda on Oman, and
Kokrokoo on Peace-contain mixes of news, interviews, call-in segments, and commentary.
Although the stations use similar programing formats, they express markedly different opinions. The quasi-governmental National Media Commission (NMC) monitored news stories over several months prior to the 2012 elections, and ranked Gold and Oman as the most biased. The stations are also widely perceived as biased. As reported in Table 2 , the majority of subjects in our experiment identified the bias of the stations, while few reported the opposite bias for our partisan stations. In total, comments by media experts, content analysis of bias, and survey responses from our subjects indicate that our station selections are appropriate. 
Selection of tro-tro routes
The first sampling stage involved selecting tro-tro routes (N=57). Tro-tros tend to follow regular routes, between an initial departure and a final destination. We selected routes with an expected minimum travel time of forty minutes, to ensure that subjects had significant exposure to the treatment, and a sufficient number of tro-tros plying the route during our study hours.
This last criterion facilitated efficient distribution of our staff-some staff members ("recruiters") were initially stationed at departure points, while others ("interviewers") worked at the destinations. We conducted an enumeration of major routes in Accra, for which research assistants visited the city's nine main terminuses and interviewed staff of the Ghana Private Road
Transport Union to identify all departure points that dispatched tro-tros to that station on a normal weekday morning. Assistants then visited these departure points and interviewed drivers about travel times and ridership patterns. In order to minimize the probability of individuals being included in our sample twice, or of subjects being in contact with others from earlier days, we never worked on the same route over multiple days.
Recruiting tro-tro drivers, random assignment and administration of treatment Next, we recruited drivers to act as our confederates (N=228). We used a simple random assignment procedure to determine the treatment condition for each tro-tro before passengers boarded. In return for ten Ghanaian cedis (about $5.26 US), drivers played the station assigned to them (or if assigned to the control condition, no station at all), without interruption, at a volume that would make the broadcast as clear as possible to passengers; 9 and without mentioning to any passenger that they had received such instructions. In order to ensure these rules were followed, a recruiter traveled in the tro-tro for the duration. Finally, drivers were instructed not to turn on the radio until after the vehicle had departed, in order to minimize the possibility that individuals would hear a certain station, and thus self-select into or out of certain treatments.
Recruitment of subjects
The last stage of sampling involved subject recruitment (N=1200). As the tro-tro neared the final destination, the recruiter announced that Ghanaian citizens who were at least eighteen-years old and who had been in the vehicle for at least forty minutes were eligible to complete a survey "about your experience with riding tro-tros in Accra, conditions faced by commuters in Accra, and what can be done to improve conditions for Ghanaians more generally." 10 Commuters were promised two cedis (about $1.05 US) in return for their time. Interviewers were waiting for 9 We required that all vehicles had working sound systems, even if they were assigned to the control.
10 A significant number of questions addressed the transit system. The survey instrument was translated into English, Ga, and Twi. Verification of random assignment and manipulation check
In order to examine whether the randomization was successfully executed, we check for statistical balance across treatment groups for observable indicators that were expected not to be affected by the treatment.
13 Table 3 reports the results of balance tests between the radio treatment and the no-radio control condition as well as aggregate balance checks. Given the many comparisons, the number of significant differences is well within the bounds of what should be expected due to chance. The results indicate that the randomization procedure was well executed and that the effects of the treatments are unlikely to be associated with confounding variables. Differences in subject attitudes and behaviors between the treatment groups can therefore reliably be attributed to the assigned radio treatment.
11 Because tro-tros vary in capacity, and because we do not have ridership figures for each vehicle included in the study, we cannot determine what proportion of eligible passengers completed an interview.
12 See Table 3 13 See the online supporting materials for a description of and a justification for including each variable in the table. As a manipulation check, subjects were asked whether the tro-tro's radio was playing and, if so, what station. 14 Of those assigned to the no-radio condition, 75% reported the radio was not playing. Of those assigned to a radio condition, 79% reported that a station was playing.
Furthermore, 76% of respondents who named a specific station (and were assigned to a radio condition) correctly named the assigned station. The most common discrepancies were mislabeling the partisan stations as the neutral station, and naming a station other than our three treatment stations. In total, only seven respondents assigned to the pro-government station said the pro-opposition station played or vice versa. The small percentage who reported a treatment that was different from what they were assigned suggests that the treatment was correctly applied. Given that subjects were not previously told they were in an experiment, we would expect some to have tuned out or forgotten what was being played.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that, of those assigned to the radio treatments, 21%
said that the radio was not playing, and another 31% said they did not know the station. Many of these subjects were likely still affected by the treatment messages even if they could not identify the specific treatment after the fact. It is also possible that they ignored the treatment entirely.
One of the greatest strengths of our research design is that individuals were exposed to media in a real-world setting with everyday distractions. Individuals had no contrived reasons to pay attention to the stimulus. If we find significant effects under these conditions, we can be more confident that partisan media are consequential in the real world.
15
14 These questions were asked at the end of the survey (as part of a set of questions about the trotro ride), so as to avoid priming subjects on the study's purpose. 15 In other words, we evaluate the effect for all those who were exposed to the treatments using an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis, rather than the effect for only those who listened with a
Measurement

Independent variables
Our independent variables are the experimental treatments converted to indicate whether subjects were exposed to like-minded or cross-cutting radio, by virtue of their partisan preference. We also include the effects of neutral radio. Here, we measure subject partisan preference as reported vote in the 2008 election. 16 We chose to measure partisan preference in a post-treatment survey so as not to alert subjects to the study prior to the treatment.
Evidence suggests that our measure of partisan preference is valid. First, reported vote in the 2008 election is balanced across the treatment pairs, indicating that it was not affected by the experiment (Table 3) . We expected that responses about pre-treatment behavior were less likely to be affected by the treatments than other possible measures of partisan preferences, such as treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) analysis. Our decision to design the study to estimate real-world impact made it impossible to collect reliable estimates of who listened to the radio. As we explain later, miscoded partisan preferences are very unlikely to be responsible for our findings.
Our analysis includes only those who reported voting for NDC or NPP in 2008, regardless of treatment (N=752).
18
The measure of partisan preference was combined with the radio treatment conditions to create measures of exposure to a station biased towards (like-minded) or against (cross-cutting) a subject's 2008 vote. Like-minded treatments included: 1) subjects who voted for the government (NDC) and were exposed to government-leaning radio (Gold), and 2) subjects who voted for the opposition (NPP) and were exposed to opposition-leaning radio (Oman). 18 Those who did not vote, did not report their vote choice or voted for a minor party were thereby excluded from the analysis, even if they were assigned to the neutral or no-radio conditions.
19 At the time of the 2008 election, NPP was the government party and NDC the opposition. To ease the discussion, we refer to the parties in relation to their status at the time of the experiment in 2012.
treatments included: 1) subjects who voted for the government (NDC) and were exposed to opposition-leaning radio (Oman), and 2) subjects who voted for the opposition (NPP) and were exposed to government-leaning radio (Gold). We also create an indicator of neutral radio exposure. Partisan respondents in these three treatment groups are always compared to partisan respondents in the no-radio control.
Dependent variables
We have four main outcome variables: three based on self-reported attitudes about NDC and NPP candidates, and one based on revealed subject behavior. 20 To determine whether likeminded and cross-cutting media increase attitude extremity we transformed the first three variables by folding each attitude measure, so that higher values indicate attitudes strongly in line with the subject's favored party, and lower values indicate attitudes strongly out of line with it.
The first outcome is a folded scale that measures favorability of attitudes towards candidates from the government party (NDC). Respondents were asked if they thought NDC candidates generally were honest, strong leaders, and capable of bringing development to Ghana.
The scale is coded so that NDC partisans have higher scores if they are favorable towards NDC 20 The Cronbach's alpha for the four outcome variables is 0.61, indicating that the four indicators, to some extent, measure a single underlying concept of extreme partisan predispositions.
candidates and NPP partisans have higher scores if they are disparaging of NDC candidates.
21
The scale ranges from zero to three.
22
The second outcome variable parallels the first except respondents were asked if NPP candidates were honest, strong, and capable. The scale is coded so that NPP partisans have higher scores if they are favorable towards NPP candidates, and NDC partisans have higher scores if they are disparaging of NPP candidates. The scale also ranges from zero to three.
23
The third outcome is a folded dichotomous variable that measures whether respondents said they would never vote for the opposing party "under any circumstances." NDC supporters were coded one if they mentioned NPP as a party for which they would never vote, and zero if they did not mention NPP. NPP supporters were coded one if they mentioned NDC as a party for which they would never vote, and zero if they did not mention NDC. In short, respondents were coded as more extreme if they said voting for the other party was unthinkable.
21 Specifically, the variable was coded so that higher values indicate more extreme attitudes about NDC candidates given respondent party preference. Respondents who voted in 2008 for NDC were coded the highest score if they thought NDC candidates were extremely honest, strong and capable; they were given the lowest score if they thought NDC candidates were not at all honest, strong, and incapable. Respondents who voted in 2008 for NPP were coded the highest score if they thought NDC politicians were not at all honest, strong and capable; they were given the lowest scores if they thought NDC candidates were extremely honest, strong and capable. Respondents who said NDC candidates were somewhat or a little honest, strong and capable received scores in the middle of the range.
22 The Cronbach's alpha for the scale is 0.87. 23 The Cronbach's alpha for the scale is 0.87.
The final measure is a behavioral one indicating whether an individual was inclined to display a partisan preference. After the survey we thanked the respondents and showed them three keychains: one prominently depicting the NDC logo, one the NPP logo, and one the Ghanaian flag. They were encouraged to select one of the three keychains to take home. 23% of respondents took the NDC keychain, 24% the NPP keychain, and 50% the keychain with the Ghanaian flag. 24 The variable is coded so that respondents received the highest value of two when they took a keychain with their own party logo, one for the flag, and zero for the other party logo. In other words, strong partisan attitudes are revealed when respondents choose to display their own party preference over their national identity.
Results
We compare partisans exposed to like-minded, cross-cutting, or neutral radio to partisans not exposed to radio. In other words, the no-radio condition is the excluded category. We estimate the following equation:
Extreme partisan attitudes or behavior = β 0 + β 1 Like-minded + β 2 Cross-cutting + β 3 Neutral + ε We run separate analyses for each of the four outcome measures: 1) attitudes about NDC candidates; 2) attitudes about NPP candidates; 3) aversion to voting for the other side; and 4) keychain selection.
24 3% did not take a keychain.
Positive estimated coefficients on like-minded (β 1 ), cross-cutting (β 2 ), or neutral (β 3 ) radio exposure would indicate that subjects in the relevant treatment groups had more extreme attitudes in line with their party preference than those in the no-radio condition. Negative estimated coefficients would indicate that subjects exposed to the relevant radio treatments had less-extreme attitudes than subjects in the no-radio condition. Thus, positive estimated coefficients indicate polarization due to the treatments, and negative coefficients indicate moderation. Notes: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients for models 1 and 2, logitistic regression coefficients for model 3, and ordered logistic regression coefficients for model 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients that can be distinguished from zero are marked as follows: * ≤ 0.10; ** ≤ 0.05; *** ≤ 0.01 (for a two-tailed test). The excluded baseline group in the analyses is subjects assigned to the no-radio condition. Table 4 reports the results from two-tailed tests of the effects of like-minded, crosscutting, and neutral radio on the extremity of attitudes about NDC candidates, NPP candidates, willingness to vote for the other side, and keychain selection. The first row of Table 4 indicates that exposure to like-minded radio is not significantly related to attitude extremity or behavioral change. These results suggest that listeners are not affected when they are exposed to media matching their partisan leanings.
Importantly, the results in the second row reveal that cross-cutting media did have a statistically significant effect on attitudes about party candidates. The estimated coefficients are negative, indicating that cross-cutting radio moderated attitudes about politicians and reduced partisan polarization. Furthermore, the negative estimated coefficient on party keychain suggests that cross-cutting radio induced respondents to prefer the symbol of national identity over partisan identity. 25 On balance, exposure to cross-cutting radio reduced partisan cleavages by encouraging moderation.
Finally, the third row in Table 4 indicates that neutral political-talk radio had no significant effect on partisan attitudes or behavior. This suggests that cross-cutting exposure, and only cross-cutting exposure, produces the moderating effect. 25 We also estimated the model with attitudes about the president as an outcome. The directions of the effects were consistent with the results from the variables presented here but were not statistically significant. Attitudes about the president are plausibly more stable than attitudes about candidates generally. (See working paper by authors).
Figure 1: Difference of Means between Treatments and No Radio for Attitude Extremity & Behavior
Notes: Positive bars indicate more extreme attitudes and selection of partisan keychain in the treatment conditions relative to the no-radio control condition. Negative bars indicate more moderate attitudes in the treatment conditions relative to the no-radio control condition. Figure 1 illustrates the above results. The height of each bar represents the difference of means between the relevant type of radio exposure and the no-radio condition. As in the analyses above, the outcome variables are depicted so that positive values indicate greater extremity of attitudes in the radio treatment groups than in the no-radio group, and negative values indicate weaker attitudes in the radio treatment groups than in the no-radio group. Note that the cross-cutting treatment has negative estimated values across all four dependent variables, which indicates that subjects exposed to cross-cutting radio have more moderate attitudes than co-partisan subjects who were not exposed to radio of any kind.
Our conclusions about the effects of like-minded, cross-cutting and neutral radio are not the product of a particular estimation procedure or model specification. The results remain largely the same when we cluster standard errors by tro-tro, estimate the effect of like-minded or cross-cutting media relative to neutral radio (rather than the no-radio control), control for subject ethnicity, and construct a scale of all the dependent variables together.
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In addition, our null findings for like-minded media and neutral media are not likely due to ceiling effects or sample size. For all outcomes, most respondents were located below the maximum value, indicating that there was space for most subjects to become more extreme.
27
Substantively, the estimated effects of like-minded media and neutral media are very close to zero. Even with a larger sample, and any associated reduction in standard errors, we would still expect null results.
Finally, it seems highly unlikely that the results are due to error with respect to our posttreatment measure of partisan preference. First, as mentioned earlier, reported vote choice in 2008 is balanced across the treatment groups, indicating that the treatment is unlikely to have 26 See the online appendix for justification and results for each robustness check. The only notable differences are that the effect of cross-cutting radio on keychain selection falls just beyond conventional levels of significance when including the clustered standard errors (p=.116). Additionally, cross-cutting radio is not significantly different from neutral radio with respect to this behavioral measure.
27 Amongst major-party partisans in the control condition, the mean values for the scales on government and opposition candidates were 2.18 and 2.07, respectively, out of a maximum score of 3. The dummy indicating aversion to ever voting for another party had a mean of 0.47, while the keychain variable had a mean of 1.54 (out of 2).
affected our measure of partisan preference. Second, we can think of no reason why moderate listeners would report having voted for the party opposite the one favored by the station to which they had just been exposed. Third, the main effects of the radio treatments are significant and in line with what we would expect based on the results of the like-minded and cross-cutting analysis. On average, pro-government radio increased support for government officials (and flag keychain selection) while opposition radio increased support for opposition politicians. Each partisan station shifted attitudes in the direction of the media bias. Crucially, the main effects analyses do not depend on the measure of partisan preferences. In sum, we expect that the results are of real-world import and not artifacts of our research design, model, or analysis.
Discussion
Why do we find that partisan media caused moderation in Ghana when most scholarship would expect polarization? The dominant perspective assumes that most individuals engage in motivated reasoning such that they readily accept arguments from their own side and argue against discordant views. Relaxing this assumption leads to different expectations. When information processing is not guided by partisan cues and outlet affiliations, then cross-cutting exposure might be more influential than like-minded exposure, since cross-cutting arguments are novel while like-minded arguments often duplicate information available from personal networks. More importantly, absent disconfirmation bias, individuals are open to persuasion by cross-cutting media.
The prevailing expectation of polarization might be a product of the particular methods employed (surveys and lab experiments) and the case predominantly studied (the United States), and might not generalize to circumstances where individuals might not engage in partisan-motivated reasoning. First, the estimated polarizing effect of partisan media might be exaggerated in survey research, since individuals who seek out partisan media are those most likely to engage in biased information processing. And lab experiments might amplify partisanmotivated reasoning by artificially heightening attention to source cues and partisan slant.
Second, demographic and political factors might mean that incidence of partisanmotivated reasoning is atypically high in the United States. Individuals are most likely to dismiss or argue against cross-cutting views when they have relatively high levels of political sophistication, partisan attachment, and distrust of the other side (Zaller 1992; Pomerantz, et al. 1995; Taber and Lodge 2006; Levendusky 2013; Arceneaux, et al. 2013) . These conditions might not be met in much of the developing world, where education rates are low, and where volatility and shifting alliances make the political landscape harder to evaluate (Mainwaring and Scully 1995 , Kuenzi and Lambright 2001 , Bielasiak 2002 , Ferree 2010 . Individuals might lack the tools and inclination to resist messages from partisan opponents. In Ghana, low secondaryschool enrollment means that large numbers could lack the political sophistication necessary to counter-argue with cross-cutting messages. 28 Ghanaians also seem to lack the distrust of crosscutting media sources that would provoke counter-arguing. For example, when asked about the stations in our study, our subjects trusted the like-minded station only slightly more than they did cross-cutting one. 29 In addition, 41.7% of subjects said they would like listening to the crosscutting station in our study during their morning commute. 28 Only 46.3% of Ghanaians have been enrolled in secondary school (World Development Indicators, 2009). 29 The difference between trust in the like-minded and cross-cutting stations is 0.49 on a fourpoint scale. This difference is statistically significant (p=.00), but not large substantively.
Are the findings of our experiment likely to be consequential in the real world? Our design replicates most real-world conditions by exposing subjects to live broadcasts in an unobtrusive way amongst real-world distractions. However, we are primarily interested here in testing media effects, not media selection. For the moderating effect of cross-cutting exposure to be of import outside the experiment, individuals must actually be exposed to media from the other side. We are not aware of representative surveys that comprehensively measure crosscutting media exposure in the developing world. However, there are reasons to expect that exposure to cross-cutting media is common.
From a theoretical standpoint, selective exposure is one outcome of partisan-motivated reasoning (Stroud 2011; Iyengar and Hahn 2009) . Given that we find little evidence of partisanmotivated information processing, we expect limited selective exposure; many individuals lack the sophistication and motivation to actively select and avoid media based on partisan preferences. Second, we expect that conditions in the developing world beget incidental exposure to cross-cutting media. Individuals spend substantial time in public or semi-public settings where they may be exposed to media not of their choosing (Nyamnjoh 2005: 16-17) .
For example, most individuals in Ghana travel within and between population centers by tro-tros rather than by private vehicles (Abane 2011) . Selective avoidance of cross-cutting messages in such settings is difficult.
From an empirical standpoint, our survey suggests considerable exposure to cross-cutting media amongst our subjects. Nearly one third (32.4%) of partisans in the control said they had listened to a program whose station did not match their bias within the last week. This figure likely underestimates how often our subjects hear cross-cutting messages, given that it does not account for less-frequent exposure (once a week or less), nor does it include exposure to the myriad partisan programs and stations beyond the two morning shows included in our survey.
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More research is needed, but what relevant evidence we have suggests that cross-cutting exposure is common enough to be consequential for politics.
How well might these conclusions from Ghana generalize to other contexts? While we cannot be certain about the generalizability beyond our experimental setting without additional research, we can develop informed expectations. We anticipate that counter-argument with cross-cutting messages would be lowest, and the persuasive effects of cross-cutting media would be greatest, where partisan identities are weak (Taber and Lodge 2006; Levendusky 2013) .
Citizens are likely especially susceptible to the moderating influence of cross-cutting media in settings with less-institutionalized party systems, such as Benin, Bulgaria, Guatemala, Latvia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Peru, and Senegal. Moderation might therefore be the most likely outcome of partisan media exposure in many post-liberalization settings.
Importantly, we do not expect that the Ghanaian results will generalize to all postliberalization settings. While partisan voting occurs in Ghana, it is far from absolute Morrison 2005, 2008; Fridy 2007; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013) . In contrast, inter-group differences have been widened and reified by violent conflict in places such as Kenya, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (LeBas 2011; Levitsky and Way 2012) . In these situations, exposure to cross-cutting messages might be less common due to increased self-selection. And when cross-cutting exposure does occur, the solidified identities prevalent in post-conflict environments might mitigate against moderating effects. In sum, we expect that most citizens in 30 Some research suggests that exposure to cross-cutting media is not uncommon even in the United States (Levendusky 2013; Garrett, et al. forthcoming; LaCour 2013) , though the extent of such exposure is a subject of debate.
new democracies or hybrid regimes will be susceptible to the persuasive (and thus moderating) effects of cross-cutting media, but such salutatory effects are unlikely where conflict has widened political divides. Unfortunately, the polities most in need of moderation might also be immune to the potential benefits of exposure to cross-cutting media. To evaluate the effect of partisan media in a newly liberalized polity, we conducted a novel field experiment in Ghana in which tro-tros (commuter mini-buses) were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Passengers heard live talk-radio from a pro-government, proopposition, or neutral station, or were in a no-radio control. We find evidence that partisan media moderated attitudes because exposure to like-minded and neutral media had no estimated effect on attitudes, while cross-cutting media decreased extreme position taking. Cross-cutting broadcasts also encouraged displays of national over partisan identity. Rather than fueling extremism, our evidence indicates that partisan media tempered attitudes by exposing citizens to alternate perspectives.
Conclusion
The study has important methodological and theoretical implications. First, our research in Ghana can serve as a caution for the study of media in the U.S. and elsewhere. Some of the polarizing effect of partisan media identified in the U.S. could be an artifact of the prevailing research designs. Observational research might overestimate the extent to which partisan media exacerbate cleavages by conflating selective exposure with media effects, and because those most prone to partisan-motivated reasoning are also those most likely to consume partisan media.
And laboratory experiments might overestimate polarization to the extent that they induce counter-argument at higher-than-typical levels. Subjects will be more attentive to partisan cues and biases when they are insulated from distractions and when they know they are being observed. Attentive subjects may be more likely to identify and react negatively to cross-cutting media than they do when more passively consuming media on a day-to-day basis. Our subjects were unaware that they were being exposed to, or questioned about, experimental treatments.
We were able to measure how individuals typically react to incidental media exposure, while still maintaining the benefits of experimental inference. It is possible that we found less counterargument in our study than in most U.S. experiments because Ghanaians are different from Americans, because individuals behave differently in the field than in the lab, or, more likely, from a combination of the two.
Second, our research suggests an alternate theoretical framework for understanding the role of partisan media, especially when individuals are unlikely to engage in motivated reasoning. Polarization might decrease if citizens moderate their attitudes upon exposure to alternate perspectives. While an established literature cites the democratic benefits of cross-cutting interpersonal communications, the same logic can be fruitfully applied to the study of partisan media. Opinionated media present political arguments in unidirectional, straightforward, and captivating ways. Strident partisan programming can help citizens pay attention to and understand arguments from the other side. Importantly, we posit that the moderating influence of partisan media is likely in many, though not all, newly liberalized polities. Low levels of political sophistication, shifting political alliances, and homogeneous social networks mean that unfamiliar arguments from cross-cutting media may be especially persuasive. In many hybrid regimes and new democracies, partisan media may be more likely to help democracy by moderating attitudes, than to harm democracy by fueling extremism.
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Online Appendix A: Description of Balance Checks
In Table 3 , we report on balance checks for nearly two dozen variables. Most of these variables are included because we did not expect that they would be affected by the treatments, while they might theoretically impact how individuals responded to the experimental treatments. These variables included demographic measures, such as sex, age, education, personal wealth, and ethnicity.
We also check for balance on variables that might have affected individuals' abilities to comprehend broadcasts, such as language ability (English, Twi, Ewe, and Ga), general frequency of radio listenership, and prior listenership to the morning shows included in the treatments. In addition, we include a variable measuring subjects' seating in the vehicle, in case individuals who were located closer to the rear were less able to hear the tro-tro's sound system.
Other variables are intended to measure tro-tro specific factors, such as the duration (in minutes) of the treatment application (as recorded by research staff who rode in the tro-tros included in the study), the starting time of the journey (in eight half-hour slots, running between 6 and 10 AM), and number of successful interviews conducted per contacted tro-tro, are also included.
Finally, as discussed in the paper, we also check for balance on variables measuring participation in and preferences regarding the 2008 presidential election (i.e., turnout, vote for NDC candidate, vote for NPP candidate, refusal to report vote).
Question wordings for variables included in the survey are listed in Appendix B. All variables except start time, duration, and interviews per tro-tro are measured at the individual level; these three variables are measured at the tro-tro level. Notes: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients for the first three outcome variables ("scale", "government candidates", and "opposition candidates"), logistic regression coefficients for "never vote for other party," and ordered logistic regression coefficients for "party keychain." The excluded baseline group in the "baseline," "trotro-clustered standard errors," and "ethnic controls" models are subjects assigned to the no-radio condition. The excluded baseline group in the "neutral radio" model includes subjects assigned to the neutral radio condition. P-values are for two-tailed tests.
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Explanation for robustness checks
First, we cluster standard errors to account for randomization at the level of the tro-tro.
Second, we use neutral radio as the excluded category to provide suggestive evidence about effects of bias separately from political discussion. Our baseline has the no-radio control because we cannot be certain that the content of the neutral station is actually perfectly neutral for all subjects. No radio is a "cleaner" control and theoretically closer to the counterfactual because Ghanaians might not listen to neutral political radio if partisan radio did not exist.
Third, we include ethnic controls to demonstrate that observable traits do not affect the results. We provide the results for ethnicity because ethnicity is strongly related to political attitudes in Ghana. The results are similar with other controls.
Finally, we create variable scale of the four outcome variables (cronbach's alpha=0.61) to provide a holistic assessment of the effects of the treatments.
